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| date | draft | math | medium_enabled | medium_post_id | tags | title |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-02-26 20:33:38-05:00 | false | true | true | 8e07b68aa8f5 | Intensional Logic Extends First Order |
The second brightest object in the sky is known as the morgensteorra (morning star) and æfensteorra (evening star). Later on this object became known as Venus. (Wikipedia)
\text{morgensteorra} = \text{æfensteorra} = \text{venus}
Gottlob Frege asks in 1892 whether we should make a distinction between a sense and a reference. (SEP) (Wikipedia)
One might be tempted to think that traditional first order logic can handle this. To show how we'll need to extend it, let us think of this problem from a cognitive perspective. Lets say that we have a relation B that stands for belief. Now lets say that an agent has a belief that Venus is the evening star.
B(\text{æfensteorra} = \text{venus})
In first order logic, we can then deduce the following:
B(\text{morgensteorra} = \text{venus})
But does that make sense? It is possible to hold a belief that Venus is the evening star while not holding a belief that Venus is the morning star. Therefore, we cannot treat belief as a traditional relation symbol. Issues like these give birth to intensional reasoning and from that modal logic.