We release Alpha v3 of HedgeDoc 2.0 and need to make sure that all
version are changed accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Philip Molares <philip.molares@udo.edu>
We don't need a library that requires as much boilerplate code as
writing the AuthGuard ourselves, especially since the token validation
was already custom code by us.
The previous name PublicAuthToken was a bit misleading, since PublicAuth
could also be interpreted as being used for the public frontend in
contrast to the API. The old name before that (AuthToken) wasn't better
since it wasn't clear what type of auth is meant. I know, this is the
second renaming of the same module in less than a month. However, I
would say the name ApiToken seems rather reasonable and understandable.
Signed-off-by: Erik Michelson <github@erik.michelson.eu>
Due to failing docker builds it was brought to our attention,
that the backend relied on the uuid package without declaring
it as dependency. This worked in all development and build
scenarios as the frontend declares uuid as dependency already
and top-level `yarn install` installs all dependencies from all
workspaces. However as the docker build only runs for either
the backend or the frontend, this failed.
This commit adds the dependency to the backend as well.
Signed-off-by: Erik Michelson <github@erik.michelson.eu>
Thanks to all HedgeDoc team members for the time discussing,
helping with weird Nest issues, providing feedback
and suggestions!
Co-authored-by: Philip Molares <philip.molares@udo.edu>
Signed-off-by: Philip Molares <philip.molares@udo.edu>
Signed-off-by: Erik Michelson <github@erik.michelson.eu>
OWASP [1] recommends for password hashing the following algorithms in
descending order: argon2id, scrypt, bcrypt. They state that bcrypt may
be used in legacy systems or when required due to legal regulations.
We're however not building any legacy application. Even HedgeDoc 1.x
utilizes a more modern algorithm by using scrypt.
While bcrypt is not insecure per se, our implementation had a major
security flaw, leading to invalid passwords being accepted in certain
cases. The bcrypt nodejs package - and the OWASP cheatsheet as well -
point out, that the maximum input length of passwords is limited to 72
bytes with bcrypt. When some user has a password longer than 72 bytes in
use, only the first 72 bytes are required to log in successfully.
Depending on the encoding (which could be UTF-8 or UTF-16 depending on
different circumstances) this could in worst-case be at 36 characters,
which is not very unusual for a password. See also [2].
This commit changes the used algorithm to argon2id. Argon2id has been in
use for several years now and seems to be a well-designed password
hashing function that even won the 2015 Password Hashing Competition.
Argon2 does not have any real-world max input length for passwords (it
is at 4 GiB).
The node-rs/argon2 implementation seems to be well maintained, widely
used (more than 150k downloads per week) and is published with
provenance, proving that the npm package was built on GitHub actions
using the source code in the repository. The implementation is written
in Rust, so it should be safe against memory leakages etc.
[1]: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Che
at_Sheet.html#password-hashing-algorithms
[2]: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/39851
Signed-off-by: Erik Michelson <github@erik.michelson.eu>
