This should prevent the issue mentioned in https://github.com/hackmdio/codimd/issues/1648
Specifically left out are
- dependency (user can't really include anything anyway, because CSP forbids most domains)
- autoSlideMethod (nothing our users should be able to change as they won't write JS to be affected by this)
- keyboard (this let's users write arbitrary code and seems therefore to problematic)
See:
https://github.com/hakimel/reveal.js/blob/3.9.2/README.md#configuration
Signed-off-by: Philip Molares <philip.molares@udo.edu>
Apparently we have stopped supporting IE11. It shows a syntax error for our JS. I have spent half an hour trying to add IE11 to our Babel config, but that did not resolve the issue. It seems bigger changes to our Webpack config might be necessary to support IE11 again, which I don't think is worthwhile. It's probably reasonable to just remove IE from the list of supported browsers.
Signed-off-by: David Mehren <git@herrmehren.de>
This makes sure no unintended files are permanently saved.
Co-authored-by: Yannick Bungers <git@innay.de>
Signed-off-by: David Mehren <git@herrmehren.de>
This commit adds a check if the MIME-type of the uploaded file (detected using the magic bytes) matches the file extension.
Signed-off-by: David Mehren <git@herrmehren.de>
This patch reworks the error messages for image uploads to make more
sense.
Instead of using the current `formidable error` for everything, all
custom error detection now provide the (hopefully) more useful `Image
Upload error` prefix for error messages.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Kern <sheogorath@shivering-isles.com>
This patch fixes the issue of unauthenticated users, being able to
upload files, even when anonymous edits are disabled.
It's implemented by blocking uploads when either `allowAnonymous` is set
to `false` for all unauthenticated users, unless `allowAnonymousEdits`
is set to true, to make sure anonymous editors still experience the full
feature set.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Kern <sheogorath@shivering-isles.com>
This patch fixes a security issue with all existing CodiMD and HedgeDoc
installation which allows arbitary file uploads to instances that expose
the `/uploadimage` API endpoint. With the patch it implies the same
restrictions on the MIME-types as the frontend does. Means only images
are allowed unless configured differently.
This issue was reported by Thomas Lambertz.
To verify if you are vulnerable or not, create two files `test.html` and
`test.png` and try to upload them to your hedgedoc installation.
```
curl -X POST -F "image=@$(pwd)/test.html" http://localhost:3000/uploadimage
curl -X POST -F "image=@$(pwd)/test.png" http://localhost:3000/uploadimage
```
Note: Not all backends are affected. Imgur and lutim should prevent this
by their own upload API. But S3, minio, filesystem and azure, will be at
risk.
Addition Note: When using filesystem instead of an external uploads
providers, there is a higher risk of code injections as the default CSP
do not block JS from the main domain.
References:
https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/security/advisories/GHSA-wcr3-xhv7-8gxc
Signed-off-by: Christoph Kern <sheogorath@shivering-isles.com>
Using jQuery's `.html()` method stores the given string as `innerHTML`, which enables injection of arbitrary DOM elements.
Using `.text()` instead mitigates this issue.
Signed-off-by: David Mehren <git@herrmehren.de>
